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Abstract 
We employ 19,521 unique firms in 30 transition economies to investigate the relation between 
the origins of private firms and their financing patterns. In our sample, the private firms are 
either privatized former state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or ab initio (from the beginning) private 
firms. Our results show that privatized former SOEs finance a higher proportion of their fixed 
assets from bank finance and supplier credit, while ab initio private firms rely more on informal 
finance. We argue that privatized former SOEs continue to benefit from the political and 
financial connections established during their SOE era. We further document that financial 
institution development affects the financing patterns of these two groups differently. In our 
sample countries, financial institution advancement benefits privatized SOEs more than it 
benefits ab initio private firms.  
 
JEL Classification: G10, G32, L33, O16 
Keywords:  Privatization; Financing pattern; Transition economy; Institution development; Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 
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In the 1990s and early 2000s, governments in many formerly planned economies carried 
out massive programs to privatize their state-owned enterprises (SOEs), a conscious political 
decision to move away from state socialism and toward entrepreneurial capitalism (Megginson 
and Netter, 2001). Several countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA hereafter) were 
among the early adopters of privatization. Privatization in these ECA countries not only aimed to 
improve efficiency but also to reform the economic system and society at large. 
In the subsequent years, a large volume of literature has examined outcomes of the 
aforementioned privatization programs; the general consensus is that privatization leads to 
improved efficiency (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Megginson, 2005). Johnson, et al. (2002) and 
Cull and Xu (2005) argue that institutional development plays a crucial role in influencing firm-
level financing and investment decisions in transition economies. Since the completion of the 
privatization programs in the ECA countries, entrepreneurial private enterprises have been 
flourishing in large part due to institutional and political encouragement (Cottarelli et al., 2005; 
Estrin et al., 2006).  
Do privatized former SOEs finance their capital investments differently than those that 
were private from the outset (ab initio)? Does institutional development has different impact on 
financing patterns of these two groups of firms?  
In this paper, we examine these two related questions in transition economies. Privatized 
former SOEs may continue to possess some of the privileges and connections to important 
institutions they had when they were state-owned (Boubakri et al., 2008). Such connections may 
give privatized firms a competitive edge over their ab initio counterparts, including preferential 
treatment by government agencies (e.g., tax policies) and state-owned banks (easier access to 
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credit). The success or failure of a country’s transition from a planned to a market economy 
depends in large part on its institutional development. A useful measuring stick is whether there 
is a level playing field for enterprises of all types. By examining the financing patterns of 
privatized versus ab initio private firms, we hope to shed more light on this question.  
In our analysis, we employ the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey (BEEPS) database that contains 19,521 firms in 30 ECA countries for 2002–2014.
1
 Our 
results show that relative to ab initio firms, privatized firms finance a higher proportion of their 
fixed assets from formal sources, especially from state-owned banks and supplier credit, and a 
lower proportion from informal sources such as moneylenders, friends, and relatives. Our results 
are robust after controlling for firm characteristics, country level economic and institutional 
development, as well as possible endogeneity issues.  
Next, we compare the effect of financial constraint on financing patterns of privatized 
versus ab initio firms. We find that when the difficulty of obtaining external finance is low, 
privatized SOEs use more bank finance, while ab initio firms elect to employ more equity 
finance. However, when the difficulty of obtaining external finance is high, privatized firms fall 
back on their old connections with state banks and established links with suppliers for their 
financing needs. In addition, after controlling for the level of financial constraint, we find that 
privatized and ab initio firms employ similar fraction of informal finance in financing of fixed 
assets.    
Finally, we find that the level of country level institutional development plays an 
important role in influencing the financing patterns of these two groups of firms. We use two 
measures to proxy for the level of a country’s financial institution development, namely:  private 
                                                          
1 The sample includes the second round to the fifth round of BEEPS. The sixth round of BEEPS is still ongoing as of Dec. 2017.  
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credit development and European Union (EU) membership. We argue that a country’s financial 
institutions are more developed when the country has a higher private credit to GDP ratio or EU 
membership.  
Our results show that when financial institution is underdeveloped, neither the privatized 
nor the ab initio firms have any clear advantage in accessing external finance. When a country’s 
financial institution has become more developed, privatized firms continue to have an advantage 
over ab initio private firms in accessing formal external finance, especially bank finance.  
This finding is particularly important and puzzling. Two decades has passed since the 
completion of the major privatization programs in the ECA countries. However, the financing 
gaps between the privatized and ab initio firms continue to exist, even as institutions are 
advancing.  One possible explanation is that privatized firms are inherently different from ab 
initio private firms in terms of business and social networks, including political connections and 
banking relationships (Boubakri et al., 2008). As such, privatized firms continue to enjoy better 
access to bank finance and supplier credit. It could also be that financial markets and institutions 
in these transition economies are improving but not yet to a point where all businesses are treated 
on a fair and meritorious basis.  
Our paper makes important contribution to the privatization literature, as this is the first 
study that compares the financing patterns of privatized SOEs and ab initio private firms in 
transition economies. More importantly, our study sheds new light in financing patterns of 
privatized versus ab initio firms in transition economies. In particular, the findings concerning 
the role of institutional development could have useful policy implications. Though privatized 
former SOEs continue to play an important role across the ECA transition economies, the future 
vitality and growth of these economies ultimately depend on the entrepreneurship and innovation 
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from the private sector, i.e. ab initio private firms.
2
 Access to formal finance by ab initio firms is 
vital to their success. To level the playing field, government efforts should be directed at making 
external formal finance more available to the private sector.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our research questions 
and related literature. Section 3 describes the data and summary statistics. Sections 4 and 5 
present the methodology and the empirical results.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
Our research question is broadly related to the capital structure literature in a cross-
country setting. Rajan and Zingales (1995) find that the variables explaining the leverage of U.S. 
firms can also explain the leverage of firms in seven other developed countries. Booth et al. 
(2001) obtain similar findings when they study the financing choices in a sample of 10 
developing countries. However, their findings also indicate the presence of large country fixed 
effects and the importance of country specific factors. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) 
investigate capital structure in 30 developed and developing countries and argue that differences 
in financing patterns can be largely explained by the differences in financial and legal 
infrastructure. Fan et al. (2003) confirm previous findings that institutional differences between 
countries are crucial in determining firm-level capital structure choices in a sample of 39 
countries. Using World Business Environment Survey (WBES) data, Beck et al. (2008) 
investigate how firm financing patterns differ around the world for large versus small firms. 
Their findings highlight the importance of firm size in financing patterns and suggest that small 
firms use less external finance, especially bank finance.  
                                                          
2 Privatized former SOEs (ab initio private firms) comprise 17% (83%) of our sample firms, respectively.   
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The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which includes most of the countries 
from the former Soviet Union, and countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)) are 
commonly referred to as Eastern European and Central Asian (ECA) countries, and their 
economies are called “transition economies.” These transition economies are less-developed 
(Hanedar et al., 2014) and generally have weak property rights, underdeveloped capital markets, 
poor governance, and a shortage of skilled labor (D'Souza et al., 2017). From the mid-1990s to 
the early 2000s, ECA countries privatized most of their SOEs with the hope that privatization 
would increase these enterprises’ efficiency and competitiveness.  
Regarding the privatized former SOEs in ECA countries, D'Souza et al. (2017) study 27 
transition economies and find that privatized SOEs experience fewer financial and legal 
obstacles and less corruption than ab initio private firms. Although privatized SOEs face fewer 
obstacles in the business environment, they underperform ab initio private firms. Ullah and Wei 
(2017) investigate the association between financing patterns and firm growth in transition 
economies and find that the use of bank finance leads to faster firm growth as opposed to the use 
of informal finance.  
However, the existing literature has not yet examined the financing patterns of privatized 
versus ab initio private firms in the transition economies. Our paper fills this literature gap. 
 
2.1. Privatized former SOEs and access to finance  
Research has established that SOEs tend to have easier access to external financing due to 
soft-budget constraint (Kornai, 1979, 1980; Megginson et al., 2014). Using a sample of 
fully/partially privatized firms, Borisova and Megginson (2011) find that a decrease in 
government ownership is linked with an increase in the cost of debt. Huyghebaert et al. (2014) 
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investigate the post-listing financing patterns of 221 partially privatized Chinese SOEs and find 
significant differences in debt/equity financing between government-controlled and non-
government-controlled firms.   
SOEs’ preferential access to finance can be inherited by their privatized successors 
through established political connections, bank connections, and supplier relationships. For 
example, Boubakri et al. (2008) find that privatized firms with greater government residual 
ownership are more likely to possess more political connections. 
Research has also established that politically connected firms experience a lower cost of 
capital. Boubakri et al. (2013) show that political connections lower the cost of equity for a firm 
thereby lowering financial constraints. Houston et al. (2014) find that the cost of loans is 
significantly lower for politically connected firms. They argue that lenders charge lower rates 
because political connections enhance borrowers’ creditworthiness. Cull et al. (2015) suggest 
that firms without government connections face greater financial constraints, and investments in 
firms without government connections are more sensitive to internal cash flows. Khwaja and 
Mian (2005) show that firms with political connections get favorable treatment from 
governments and financial institutions.  
Based on previous literature, we conjecture that privatized former SOEs have a 
competitive advantage over their ab initio counterparts in terms of preferential treatment by 
government agencies, suppliers, financial institutions, and other stakeholders.  
 
2.2. Ab initio private firms and access to finance  
In recent times, transition economies gradually have moved away from centrally planned 
economies to market-based diversified systems. However, these economies still face problems of 
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more serious information asymmetry and lower degree of bank intermediation (Hanedar et al., 
2014). Their banking systems still lack efficiency and capability to meet the needs of smaller 
private firms (Brandt and Li, 2003). Limited availability of bank finance is a significant 
impediment to small, young, and private firms in these countries.  
In developed countries, promising young and private firms usually have access to early-
stage venture capital or small business loans from formal sources (Fenn et al., 1997). However, 
this is not the case in transition economies. Young and private firms are less likely to have 
political and institutional connections as compared to SOEs and privatized former SOEs. Despite 
the rapid growth and increasing importance of the private sector in transition economies, private 
firms find it difficult to obtain external finance form formal sources (Pistor et al., 2000).  
Based on the above discussions, we conjecture that ab initio private firms are more 
constrained than the privatized former SOEs in accessing external finance from formal sources 
(i.e. banks and supplier credits) and thus, rely more on financing from informal sources (i.e. 
money lenders, friends and relatives, and non-banking financial institutions).  
 
2.3. Privatization, financial institution development, and access to finance  
A country’s legal and financial institutions play an important role in increasing access to 
external financing (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). Studies have established a significant link 
between institutional development, external financing, and firm performance (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Beck et al., (2008) highlight the importance 
of improving a country’s institutional environment to increase small firms’ access to external 
finance.  
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We choose private credit and European Union (EU) membership to proxy for the 
development of a country’s financial institutions. Private credit is an indicator commonly used to 
measure financial market development, defined as credit extended to private businesses over 
GDP (Beck et al., 2008). Baltagi et al. (2009) argue that private credit is an important factor for 
the development of new firms and a major indicator of financial development. Beck et al. 
(2000a) find that a higher level of private credit is associated with faster GDP growth rate. 
Figure 1a compares the external financing patterns between high private-credit countries 
(countries with the private credit to GDP ratio higher than the sample median) and low private-
credit countries (countries with the private credit to GDP ratio lower than the sample median). 
As shown in Figure 1a, firms in high private-credit countries use more bank finance, equity 
finance, supplier credit, and informal finance than those in low private-credit countries.  
[Insert Figure 1a about here] 
 EU membership is another indicator we use to proxy for financial and institutional 
development. EU members differ from non-member countries in terms of access to markets, 
regulatory and business environments, and quality of institutions, among others. Relatively 
speaking, EU member countries have more developed financial markets and more efficient 
institutions. These institutional differences should have an impact on firm-level financing 
patterns. Moreover, the EU helps its new members restructure their banking sector and provides 
new sources of finance to the entrants (Popov and Ongena, 2011; Caporale et al., 2015). Figure 
1b compares the external financing patterns between EU countries and non-EU countries. In all 
measures, firms in EU countries use more external finance.     
[Insert Figure 1b about here] 
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Based on the above discussions, we argue that country level financial and institutional 
development should have an impact on the relation between the origins of private firms (i.e. 
privatized versus ab initio) and their financing patterns. More specifically, we conjecture that the 
advancement of financial markets and institutions should be able to mitigate the discrepancies 
between privatized and ab initio firms in accessing to external finance from formal sources.  
 
3. Data 
We start with all observations in the BEEPS database and delete firms that do not have 
answers to the question: “How was the firm established?” We keep firms only if the answer to 
the above question is either 1 (“Privatization of a state-owned firm”) or 2 (“Originally private, 
from time of start-up”).
3
 We also exclude firms with missing values for their financing source. 
Our sample includes the second round to the fifth round of BEEPS, which consists of 19,521 
unique firms in 33 industries from 30 ECA countries. The sixth round of BEEPS is ongoing as of 
December 2017. Among these firms, 3,320 are privatized former SOEs and 16,201 are firms that 
were private from the outset (ab initio).  Table A1 in the Appendix presents the number of 
privatized and ab initio private firms surveyed by country.  
BEEPS relies on standardized survey instruments in collecting firm-level data.
4
 The 
survey respondents are mainly business owners and/or firm top managers. The survey focuses on 
                                                          
3 The BEEPS database for ECA countries also contains some not-yet privatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Due to the 
relatively small number of SOE observations and the focus of this paper, we do not include SOEs in our analysis.  
4 For a literature survey of firm-level studies using BEEPS and WBES data, see Xu (2010). These data have been used to 
investigate a series of questions in finance and development economics, including obstacles in the business environment  and 
firm growth (e.g., Beck et al., 2005; Ayyagari et al., 2008a; Ullah and Wei, 2017), firm innovation (e.g., Ayyagari et al., 2011, 
2014), the relation between property rights and contracting institutions (e.g., Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Ayyagari et al., 
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assessing the critical obstacles in the business environment that hinder firm growth. The survey 
also contains information on the origins of the enterprises (private or privatized), firm financing 
sources, firm ownership, sales, employees, top manager experience, whether a firm is an 
exporter, and firm age.
5
   
Table 1 reports firm-level financing sources by country. In BEEPS, business owners 
and/or firm top managers were asked this question, “Over the last fiscal year, please estimate the 
proportion of this establishment’s total purchase of fixed assets that was financed from each of 
the following sources?” The financing sources include internal funds or retained earnings 
(internal finance), borrowed funds from banks (bank finance), which can be further separated 
into state-owned banks (state bank) and private banks (private bank), owners’ contribution or 
issued new equity shares (equity finance), purchases on credit from suppliers (supplier credit), 
and other informal sources such as moneylenders, friends, relatives, and non-banking financial 
institutions (informal finance). These proportions add up to 100%. The focus of our research is 
on external financing sources, i.e. bank finance (including state and private bank finance), equity 
finance, supplier credit, and informal finance.  
As shown in Table 1, an average firm in the sample finances its capital investment with 
about 32% external sources, indicating that about 68% of the financing comes from internal 
funds or retained earnings. The statistics suggests that firms rely heavily on internally generated 
funds for growth in transition economies, which is an indication of financial market 
underdevelopment in these countries. Among the external sources, firms obtain the highest 
proportion from private banks, followed by informal sources, equity, supplier credit, and state 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2008b), firm-financing patterns (e.g., Beck et al., 2008; Cull and Xu, 2005; and Ayyagari et al., 2010), and dispute resolution via 
courts (e.g., Djankov et al., 2003). 
5 Detailed survey information is available at http://ebrd-beeps.com/about/. 
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banks. There are wide variations of firm financing patterns among the ECA countries. For 
instance, firms in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia, and Turkey obtain more 
than 24% of their total financing from bank finance, whereas Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
and Uzbekistan, obtain less than 10% from bank finance. On the other hand, firms in the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, and Slovakia obtain more than 10% of their financing from 
informal sources. Similar wide variations in supplier credit and equity financing can also be 
observed among the ECA countries.  
[Insert Table 1 about here]  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
In our regression analyses, the dependent variables are Bank Finance, State Bank, Private 
Bank, Equity Finance, Supplier Credit, and Informal Finance, as described in Table A2.  
Among the explanatory variables, the key variable, Privatized, is an indicator variable 
that equals one if the firm is a privatized former SOE and zero if the firm is an ab initio private 
firm. We control for several firm-level characteristics. Firm size is an important control variable 
as prior literature suggests that smaller firms exhibit superior performance improvement in the 
post-privatization era (Harper, 2002) as compared to larger firms, which are resistant to changes 
(Aussenegg and Jelic, 2007; Villalonga, 2000).  However, larger firms face lower levels of 
financial constraints (Beck et al. 2005). In a different study, Beck et al. (2008) find that smaller 
firms use less external finance, especially bank finance, and rely heavily on informal finance. 
Thus, we can safely say that firm size plays an important role in determining the financing 
patterns of firms. We use the number of permanent, full-time employees of the firm for the Firm 





 As reported in Table 2 (Panel A), the mean of Firm Size is 103.89 while the 
median of Firm Size is 22.  
We also control for firm growth. A firm’s growth opportunity is commonly represented 
by its Tobin’s Q. Due to the lack of such data in BEEPS, we use the firms’ employment growth 
rate over the previous three years as an indicator of Firm Growth. D'Souza et al. (2017) show 
that ab initio private firms in transition economies have a significantly higher employment 
growth rate than privatized firms. In our sample, the average firm growth rate is 7% as indicated 
in Table 2 (Panel A).  
We also control for exporting firms. Exporting firms may have different financial 
relationships with financial institutions (such as export/import banks) and suppliers than non-
exporting firms. Moreover, such firms experience better growth and performance as compared to 
non-exporters (Beck et al., 2005). Exporters also face fewer firm-level business obstacles 
(financial, legal, and corruption) and rely more heavily on external finance than non-exporters 
(Beck et al., 2006; Beck et al., 2008). We use a dummy variable, Exporter, to indicate if a firm 
exports part or all of its products. In our sample, about 28% of the firms export as reported in 
Table 2 (Panel A). 
We further control for foreign ownership in a firm. Foreign ownership exposes firms to 
foreign markets, technology, managerial and technical expertise, and monitoring which may lead 
to improved operating performance (Boubakri et al., 2005) and financial performance (Fishman 
and Svensson, 2007). Beck et al. (2005) find that foreign ownership has a large positive effect on 
firm performance. Firms with a foreign ownership stake face less firm-level business obstacles 
                                                          
6 BEEPS also has firms’ sales data in local currencies, which can be used to proxy for firm size. However, compared to sales, 
employment is typically more reliable in developing countries. Therefore, the number of permanent, full-time employees is used 
as a measure of firm size by the World Bank Group and many other international survey teams. 
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and finance a larger share of investment with equity finance, but a lower share with lease and 
trade finance (Beck et al., 2006; Beck et al., 2008). We use a dummy variable, Foreign, to 
indicate if any foreign company/individual has an ownership stake in the firm. As shown in 
Table 2 (Panel A), about 11% of our sample firms have foreign ownership.   
As part of our robustness checks, we control for a firm’s perceived financing constraints 
in some of the regressions. The BEEPS survey contains various indicators of obstacles to firm 
growth. We focus on firm financial obstacles (Financing Obstacle), which are survey responses 
to the question: “Is access to financing, which includes availability and cost [interest rates, fees 
and collateral requirements], No Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Major Obstacle, or a Very 
Severe Obstacle to the current operations of this establishment?” The responses take values 
between 0 and 4, where 0 indicates no financial obstacle and 4 indicates a very severe financial 
obstacle. Financing Obstacle is included in the regression to proxy a firm’s cash constraint 
(Beck et al., 2008).  
Industry characteristics have an important impact on firm characteristics and dynamics. 
Our sample includes firms from 33 industries. We use industry dummies to control for industry 
effects. We control for country fixed effects with country dummies. In addition, in all our 
regressions, we control for year fixed effects by including year dummies. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents a correlation matrix of all the dependent and independent 
variables described above. We do not observe any correlation coefficient great than 0.5 for any 
pair of independent variables, indicating that multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue.  
We also present univariate test results for the firm-level variables between privatized and 
ab initio private firms. As shown in Table 2 (Panel C), relative to ab initio private firms, 
privatized firms finance a higher proportion of their investment from bank finance (both state 
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and private banks) and supplier credit, and a lower proportion of their investment from informal 
sources. The results also show that privatized firms are larger but grow at a slower speed than ab 
initio private firms. Privatized firms are also more likely to be exporters and to have foreign 
ownership stakes.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
In the latter part of this paper, we include country-level macroeconomic variables, GDP, 
GDP per capita, GDP Growth, and Inflation, and financial development proxies (private credit 
to GDP ratio or EU membership) into our regressions. Detailed variable definitions and sources 
are given in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
Table 3 shows that there are wide variations among the ECA countries in terms of 
economy size, economic development, and financial market development. Our sample includes 
some large economies (such as Russia, Turkey, and Poland) as well as some relatively smaller 
ones (such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Montenegro), as measured by their GDP. Economic 
development in terms of GDP per capita ranges from a low of $351 in Tajikistan to a high of 
$18,030 in Slovenia. Developing countries, such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, 
grow faster than more-developed countries. The countries also vary significantly in the rate of 
inflation, from a low of 2% in Kosovo, up to a high of 54% in Belarus. Private Credit also varies 
widely across the ECA countries. Among all the ECA countries, 37% of them are members of 
the EU as of 2014. In general, firms in countries with higher levels of financial institution 
development have better access to external finance (see Figures 1a, 1b and 1c).   
Overall, these economies present a unique, yet underexplored, set of countries with wide 
variations in economic and institutional development.   
[Insert Table 3 about here] 




4. Methodology and results 
4.1. Methodology 
Our empirical approaches are as follows. As the dependent variables in our study, i.e. 
firm-level financing pattern observations, are censored between 0 and 100, we use Tobit 
regressions to estimate our empirical models.
7
 First, in our baseline regression, we employ a 
Tobit model that includes fixed effects for year, country, and industry. To check for potential 
endogeneity, we use the PSM technique. As an alternative to country dummies, we include 
country-level variables to control for variations in macroeconomic and financial institution 
development among the ECA countries. We further partition the full sample into various 
subsamples based on several firm and country characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the 
country level.   
 
4.2. Baseline regression 
We first estimate a baseline regression model that includes firm-level explanatory 
variables and controls for year, country, and industry fixed effects with respective dummies. Our 
baseline model is specified as follows: 
 
 
The subscripts i and j represent firm and country, respectively. The dependent variable, 
Financing Source, represents the six sources of financing, i.e. Bank Finance, State Bank, Private 
                                                          
7 In untabulated results, we also estimate all the regressions using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method and obtain very 
similar results.  
Financing Sourcei,j = α + β1 Privatizedi,j + β2 Firm Sizei,j + β3 Firm Growthi,j  
                                  + β4 Exporteri,j +  β5 Foreigni,j + εi,j                                (1) 
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Bank, Equity Finance, Supplier Credit, and Informal Finance. Bank Finance equals the sum of 
State Bank and Private Bank. The explanatory variable of our focus is Privatized, an indicator 
for privatized former SOEs. The regression results are presented in Table 4 (Panel A).  
As shown, the coefficients of Privatized, β1, are positive and significant for Bank Finance 
(column (1)), State Bank (column (2)), and Supplier Credit (column (5)), and negative and 
significant for Informal Finance (column (6)). These results show that privatized firms use 
significantly more bank finance and supplier credit, while ab initio private firms use significantly 
more informal finance. Ab initio private firms rely more on informal sources most likely because 
they face more difficulties in accessing bank finance and credit from suppliers. The results 
further show that privatized firms have significantly better access to state-owned banks than ab 
initio private firms (column (2)). However, these two groups of firms have similar access to 
private banks and new equity finance (columns (3) and (4)).  
These findings are important for the following two reasons. First, they are consistent with 
our conjecture that in transition economies, state institutions, such as state-owned banks, 
continue to favor old connections and ties that privatized firms are more likely to possess. 
Second, non-state institutions, such as private banks, and equity markets, provide a level playing 
field for private enterprises of all origins. These findings represent a bright spot and hope in the 
transition economies. In fact, in our sample, private banks provide four times as much financing 
to businesses as do the state banks (13.51% vs. 3.29%) (Table 1).        
Table 4 (Panel A) also documents that firm financing patterns are linked to several other 
firm characteristics. Larger firms have easier access to bank finance, while smaller firms rely 
more on new equity finance. This is not surprising in that bigger firms may also have higher 
fraction of fixed assets that can collateralized to secure loans from banks, while smaller firms 
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must rely on raising equity capital from new or existing owners to meet their investment needs. 
High-growth firms mainly rely on private banks, supplier credit, as well as informal finance for 
their growth. Interestingly, exporters are linked to private banks and supplier credit, but not state 
banks. This finding could indicate that state banks in transition economies play an insignificant 
role in capital investments in the export sector. Last, we document that firms with foreign 
ownership stakes use significantly less bank finance for their capital investment than their pure 
domestic counterparts. One reason could be that pure domestically owned firms have better 
relations with domestic banks than foreign firms. Another reason can be that foreign investors 
bring other sources of financing not mentioned in the surveys, such as funds from parent 
companies and/or foreign banks.     
In Panel B of Table 4, we check for potential endogeneity between a firm’s sources of 
financing and its origin (privatized versus ab initio). At the onset of the privatization programs in 
the ECA countries, some SOEs were chosen to be privatized; these choices were not random 
events. As economic reforms deepened, an overwhelming majority of the SOEs were privatized 
in these countries. Moreover, almost two decades have passed since major privatization 
programs in the ECA countries have concluded, and there is little evidence of re-nationalization 
of privatized firms, regardless of the financing choices made by firms. Therefore, endogeneity 
problems arising from reverse causality is less of a concern is this study. We employ the 
propensity score matching (PSM) technique to address the potential endogeneity problems 
related to selection bias or omitted variables arising from unobserved firm heterogeneity.  
The PSM technique estimates the propensity scores (likelihood of receiving treatment, 
i.e. privatization) of all observations and matches each treated observation with one or more 
untreated observations (the control) according to their propensity scores. The PSM technique 
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involves the following steps. First, we perform a probit estimation of the probability of receiving 
treatment, i.e. privatization and use firm related variables like firm size, growth, exporter dummy 
and foreign ownership dummy in this estimation model. Next, we form matched pairs of 
observations with similar estimated probabilities but different realizations of the treatment (i.e., 
privatized firms are matched with ab initio private firms). We use one-to-many matching. 
Finally, we calculate the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) for the differences in 
financing types between the two groups. The unmatched/unadjusted effects and average 
treatment effects on the treated (ATT) are presented in Panel B of Table 4. As reported in 
column (4), the average treatment effects on the treated observations are significantly higher than 
the controls when the outcomes are Bank Finance, State Bank, and Supplier Credit. These results 
are largely consistent with the baseline regression results reported in Panel A of Table 4.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
4.3. The effect of firms’ perceived financial constraints 
A firm’s financing pattern is most likely influenced by its financial constraints. As a 
robustness check, we include a Financing Obstacle variable in our baseline regression model. 
This variable captures survey responses concerning a firm’s difficulties in accessing external 
finance. The results are presented in Table 5. As shown in Panel A, the results for the full sample 
are largely consistent with our baseline results in that privatized firms have better access to 
supplier credit and bank finance in general and particularly, state bank finance. However, after 
controlling for firm financial constraints, we find no difference between the privatized versus ab 
initio private firms in employing informal finance.  
We next divide the sample into two subsamples based on firms’ perceived degree of 
difficulty in accessing external finance, i.e. one subsample of firms with no to minor (low) 
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finance obstacles and another of firms with moderate to severe (high) finance obstacles. The 
results for firms with low finance obstacles are reported in Panel B and those for high finance 
obstacles firms are reported in Panel C.  
As shown in Panel B, among the firms that reported low financial constraints, privatized 
firms elect to use more finance from private banks, while the ab initio firms use more equity 
financing for their investment need. These findings are quite interesting. In an environment 
where capital is relatively accessible, privatized firms choose private banks over state banks for 
their investment needs. When capital is readily available from private banks, these privatized 
firms do not need to or elect not want to use their connections with state banks or suppliers. The 
ab initio firms’ preference for new equity finance could be attributable to capital injections by 
venture capital firms or by existing owners due to improved business prospects (no such data 
available in the survey).      
As shown in Panel C, among the firms that report relatively high finance obstacles, the 
privatized firms exhibit a significant advantage over the ab initio firms in accessing state bank 
financing and supplier credit. The findings are also interesting in that when times are tough (i.e. 
(having trouble obtaining external finance), privatized firms can always count on their old 
political connections with state banks and established relations with suppliers for financing 
needs. On the other hand, the ab initio firms are constrained in all fronts. They could not count 
on even family, friends or moneylenders as financial cushions.    
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
4.4. The effects of firm lifecycle 
Literature has shown that firm age is an important variable while analyzing firm-level 
policies and outcomes (Rahman, 2011, D’Souza et al. 2017). Firms at different stages of their 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2746716 
22 
 
lifecycles may rely on difference sources of financing (Vos et al., 2007).  As shown in Table 2 
Panel C), the average privatized firm is 29.1 years old, while the average ab initio firm is 11.6 
years old, an 17.5 years in age gap. It is possible that his age gap contributes to the variations of 
financing patterns between the privatized versus the ab initio firms, as the longer a firm is in 
business, the more business and banking relations it establishes, Ceteris paribus.   As a 
robustness check, we examine the effect of firm age on financing patterns of privatized versus 
the ab initio firms. 
The results are reported in Table 6. As shown in Panel A, after adding firm age as a 
control to our baseline model, the results are largely consistent with the baseline results shown 
Table 4 (Panel A). That is, privatized firms continue to have better access to bank finance and 
supplier credit. However, the variation of the use of informal finance between the privatized and 
the ab initio firms disappears. 
We further divide the sample into established firms (older than 5 years) and young firms 
(5 years or younger) and examine the effect of firm age on financing patterns.
8
  85% of our 
sample firms are established firms (Panel B) and 15% are relatively young firms (Panel C). The 
results documented in the established subsample (Panel B) are consistent with and more 
pronounced than the full sample results (Table 4, Panel A). For the relatively young subsample 
of firms (Panel C), privatized firms do not have any advantage over the ab initio firms in 
accessing bank finance or supplier credits. Interestingly, young privatized firms rely significantly 
more informal finance than their ab initio counterparts.   
Based on findings in this section, we conclude that our baseline results are robust after 
controlling for the effect of firm age.  The fact that the documented variations in financing 
                                                          
8
 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) defines established firms as those in business for 3.5 years or longer: 
https://www.gemconsortium.org/ . We obtain similar results using 4 years or older to define a firm as an 
established one. 
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patterns are solely driven by the established firms lends further support for our hypothesis. That 
is, political and business connections established long ago by the privatized former SOEs 
continue to be useful. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
5. The effects of macroeconomic and financial institution development  
A country’s economic and financial development play an important role in firm-level 
financing and investment decisions (Cull and Xu, 2005; Johnson et al., 2002). In this section, we 
control for a country’s macroeconomic situation and financial institution development.  
 
5.1. The effects of economic development  





The subscripts i and j represent firm and country, respectively. We retain year and 
industry dummies but exclude country dummies in these regressions. The results are reported in 
Table 7 (Panel A). After controlling for a country’s economic development, privatized firms 
continue to exhibit significant advantage in accessing state bank finance and supplier credit, 
whereas ab initio private firms rely more on informal finance. These results are consistent with 
our baseline results reported in Table 4 (Panel A). 
Financing Sourcei,j = α + β1 Privatizedi,j + β2 Firm Sizei,j + β3 Firm Growthi,j  
                                  + β4 Exporteri,j + β5 Foreigni,j + β6 GDPj + β7 GDP per capita j  
                                  +β8 GDP Growth j + β9 Inflation j + εi,j                                 (2) 
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5.2. The effects of credit market development 
Credit market development is should have a direct impact on firm-level financing 
patterns. In this section, we use Private Credit to proxy for credit market development, defined 
as credit extended to private businesses over GDP. We include Private Credit in our baseline 





The results are presented in Panel B of Table 7. As shown, after controlling for Private 
Credit, the results are highly consistent with our baseline findings in significant levels and 
magnitudes.  
We further divide the full sample into two subsamples based on the median of Private 
Credit ratios and re-estimate Equation (2). In countries with relatively underdeveloped credit 
markets (below median Private Credit ratios), neither privatized nor ab initio firms have clear 
advantage over one another in obtaining all sources of external finance (Table 7, Panel B1). In 
countries with relatively more developed credit markets (above median Private Credit ratios), 
the results are consistent with our baseline findings (Table 7, Panel B2).  
The above subsample analyses indicate the existence of a threshold in the credit market 
development. When the credit market is underdeveloped and the availability of all types of funds 
is limited, neither privatized nor ab initio firms has a clear advantage in accessing external 
finance. Only when the credit market has developed to a certain level can privatized firms exploit 
their political connections and established supplier relationships to their benefit.      
Financing Sourcei,j = α + β1 Privatizedi,j + β2 Firm Sizei,j + β3 Firm Growthi,j  
                                  + β4 Exporteri,j +  β5 Foreigni,j + β6 GDPj + β7 GDP per Capita j  
                                 +β8 GDP Growth j + β9 Inflation j + β10 Private Credit + εi,j         (3) 




5.3. The effects of EU membership 
Eleven of the thirty countries in our sample are members of the EU.
9
 We replace Private 
Credit with EU membership in Equation (3) and report the Tobit regression results in Panel C of 
Table 7. As shown, the results are consistent with our baseline results (Table 4, Panel A).  
We then divide the full sample into EU and non-EU subsamples and re-estimate Equation 
(2) separately for the subsamples. We find that in non-EU countries where credit markets and 
institutions are relatively less developed, neither the privatized nor the ab initio firms have any 
advantage over one another in accessing bank finance or equity capital. However, privatized 
firms continue to rely more on supplier credit, while ab initio firms rely more on informal 
finance (Table 7, Panel C1). In EU countries where credit markets and institutions are relatively 
more developed, privatized firms have better access to bank finance (both state and private), 
whereas the ab initio firms use more equity finance (Table 7, Panel C2). We also observe 
interesting findings that in the EU subsample of firms, the variations in the usage of informal 
finance and supplier credit disappear between the privatized and the ab initio firms. This 
suggests that in more developed economies, firms tend to turn to formal financial markets (bond 
and equity markets) for financing needs, instead of through business relations or informal 
sources. 
 [Insert Table 7 about here] 
Together, the results in Table 7 show that financial and institutional development has a 
significant impact on the financing patterns of privatized versus ab initio private firms. In 
                                                          
 9 As of December 2014, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia are member of the EU.   
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countries with underdeveloped financial markets and institutions, neither privatized nor ab initio 
firms have any advantage over one another in accessing bank finance. However, in countries 
with relatively more developed financial market and institutions, privatized firms have an 




In this paper, we investigate how firm financing patterns differ between privatized former 
SOEs and ab initio private firms. Using a unique firm-level survey database, we find that the 
origin of the private enterprises (privatized or ab initio private) is an important determinant in 
explaining the observed variations in firm financing patterns in the ECA countries. We document 
that privatized firms finance their investment with higher proportions of bank finance and 
supplier credit, while ab initio private firms rely more on informal sources such as moneylenders, 
friends and relatives, or non-banking financial institutions. Our results are robust after 
controlling for firm- and country-level characteristics. We further document that financial 
institution development has an important impact on the financing patterns of privatized versus ab 
initio private firms. In sum, we argue that privatized firms in these transition economies continue 
to benefit from their political, business, and financial connections formed during the SOE era.  
As these ECA countries continue to rise from the ashes of their socialist past, an 
important aim of their market and institutional advancement should be to provide a level playing 
field for businesses of all origins, be it privatized or ab initio private. We find that the playing 
field in these transition economies are not yet level for the ab initio private firms. Political and 
institutional efforts should be directed to improve that. 
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Figure 1: Financing patterns and financial institution development 
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Table 1: Financing patterns in transition economies by country  
 
The table presents firm financing patterns averaged for each of the sample countries. State Bank, Private Bank, 
Equity Finance, Supplier Credit, and Informal Finance are firm’s proportion of investment financed by state-owned 
banks, private banks, equity, supplier credit, and informal sources, respectively. Bank Finance = State Bank + 
Private Bank. External Finance = Bank Finance + Equity Finance + Supplier Credit + Informal Finance. Variable 


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Albania 20.71 12.63 0.00 13.67 2.37 1.30 4.41 
Armenia 38.13 17.56 2.21 15.62 10.73 1.33 8.51 
Azerbaijan 16.98 5.93 0.38 4.50 2.10 3.14 5.81 
Belarus 28.89 11.74 5.89 5.79 2.89 5.39 8.87 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 48.54 24.90 2.47 21.22 7.90 10.47 5.27 
Bulgaria 31.62 19.10 2.86 17.46 1.54 2.74 8.23 
Croatia 39.84 24.36 6.21 23.00 4.34 3.55 7.59 
Czech Republic 42.89 14.71 3.91 9.78 6.14 4.93 17.11 
Estonia 35.79 19.06 0.59 17.84 2.08 3.77 10.88 
Georgia 32.14 20.11 1.38 22.39 6.40 1.98 3.65 
Hungary 41.99 19.14 5.91 13.72 12.52 1.65 8.67 
Kazakhstan 25.25 15.79 2.34 16.21 2.99 3.21 3.26 
Kosovo 27.83 16.39 . . 9.81 0.16 1.46 
Kyrgyzstan 24.72 8.08 1.46 6.77 4.43 3.69 8.52 
Latvia 42.48 20.45 3.35 21.71 9.01 5.10 7.92 
Lithuania 40.13 19.46 2.35 18.11 5.00 4.44 11.23 
Macedonia 31.24 20.70 2.04 20.30 3.63 2.23 4.68 
Moldova 33.99 18.01 0.67 18.22 4.51 4.61 6.86 
Mongolia 29.38 15.45 . . 2.71 2.23 8.98 
Montenegro 59.69 28.60 5.47 29.16 15.95 10.38 4.77 
Poland 28.55 14.90 4.50 10.54 1.63 3.49 8.53 
Romania 32.33 16.95 2.49 15.28 4.11 4.02 7.26 
Russia 23.75 11.25 3.83 8.76 3.68 5.09 3.74 
Serbia 34.72 17.25 2.29 14.41 6.04 6.25 5.17 
Slovakia 39.16 14.42 1.75 11.40 6.88 3.92 13.94 
Slovenia 36.24 25.35 15.92 11.58 2.66 2.60 5.63 
Tajikistan 26.88 5.54 2.73 2.67 10.48 2.71 8.14 
Turkey 40.97 29.08 . . 6.22 2.58 3.08 
Ukraine 32.07 12.89 1.14 12.95 9.14 4.96 5.09 
Uzbekistan 11.37 7.35 2.64 3.81 1.07 1.56 1.39 
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Table 2: Summary statistics and univariate tests 
 
Panel A and Panel B of this table report the summary statistics and correlation matrix for the variables, respectively. 
Panel C reports the univariate test results for the differences between privatized and ab initio private firms. N is the 
number of firm-level observations, except for country-level variables. Privatized is a dummy that equals one if a 
firm is a privatized former SOE, and zero if a firm is an ab initio private firm. State Bank, Private Bank, Equity 
Finance, Supplier Credit, and Informal Finance are the firm’s proportion of investment financed by state-owned 
banks, private banks, equity, supplier credit, and informal sources, respectively. Bank Finance=State Bank + Private 
Bank. Firm Size is the firm’s number of permanent, full-time employees. Firm Growth is the firm’s growth rate in 
the number of permanent, full-time employees. Exporter equals one if the firm is an exporter, and zero otherwise. 
Foreign equals one if any foreign company or individual has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm, zero 
otherwise. Financing Obstacle is survey responses for firm-level financial obstacles as specified in the survey 
questionnaires. GDP is the log of real GDP in U.S. dollars. GDP per Capita is the log of real GDP per capita in U.S. 
dollars. GDP Growth is the real GDP growth rate. Inflation is the log difference of consumer price indices. Private 
Credit is the ratio of domestic banking credit to the private sector divided by GDP. EU equals one if a country 






indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
 
 N Mean Median SD Min Max 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Privatized 19,521 0.17 0 0.38 0 1 
Bank Finance 19,521 16.20 0 30.60 0 100 
State Bank 13,867 3.29 0 14.88 0 100 
Private Bank 13,867 13.51 0 28.38 0 100 
Equity Finance 19,521 5.12 0 19.18 0 100 
Supplier Credit 19,521 3.97 0 15.39 0 100 
Informal Finance 19,521 6.93 0 21.37 0 100 
Firm Size 19,458 103.89 22 375.65 1 12,000 
Firm Growth 18,193 0.07 0.03 0.21 -0.56 0.70 
Exporter 19,449 0.28 0 0.45 0 1 
Foreign 19,439 0.11 0 0.31 0 1 
Financing Obstacle 17,546 1.37 1 1.25 0 4 
Firm Age 19,421 14.57 11 14.70 1 184 
GDP 30 24.62 24.51 1.73 21.62 27.39 
GDP per Capita 30 8.34 8.49 0.90 5.86 9.80 
GDP Growth 30 4.44 3.89 2.03 1.65 11.96 
Inflation 30 10.16 5.84 9.45 2.13 53.64 
Private Credit 30 30.56 28.13 13.54 5.91 64.94 
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Panel C: Univariate tests for privatized versus ab initio private firms 
 
 
 Privatized SOEs  Ab initio Private Firms  T-Tests 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 N Mean  N Mean  Difference  
(1)-(2) 
T-value 
Bank Finance 3,320 18.35  16,201 15.76  2.59 4.45*** 
State Bank 2,718 4.52  11,149 2.99  1.53 4.81*** 
Private Bank 2,718 14.73  11,149 13.22  1.51 2.49** 
Equity Finance 3,320 4.83  16,201 5.18  -0.35 -0.96 
Supplier Credit 3,320 4.62  16,201 3.83  0.78 2.67*** 
Informal Finance 3,320 5.75  16,201 7.17  -1.42 -3.49*** 
Firm Size 3,309 274.93  16,149 68.84  206.10 29.38*** 
Firm Growth 3,156 -0.00  15,037 0.09  -0.09 -23.22*** 
Exporter 3,306 0.38  16,143 0.26  0.12 14.41*** 
Foreign 3,320 0.15  16,119 0.10  0.04 6.81*** 
Financing Obstacle 3,095 1.35  14,451 1.37  -0.03 -1.10 
Firm Age 3,271 29.10  16,150 11.62  17.48 69.23*** 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Privatized (1)
Bank Finance (2) 0.03 ***
State Bank (3) 0.04 *** 0.41 ***
Private Bank (4) 0.02 ** 0.88 *** -0.08 ***
Equity Finance (5) -0.01 -0.09 *** -0.04 *** -0.08 ***
Supplier Credit (6) 0.02 *** -0.06 *** -0.02 * -0.05 *** -0.03 ***
Informal Finance (7) -0.03 *** -0.11 *** -0.05 *** -0.12 *** -0.06 *** -0.04 ***
Firm Size (8) 0.21 *** 0.07 *** 0.02 *** 0.07 *** -0.01 0.01 * -0.02 ***
Firm Growth (9) -0.17 *** 0.05 *** 0.00 0.06 *** 0.01 0.02 ** 0.02 *** 0.00
Exporter (10) 0.10 *** 0.11 *** 0.04 *** 0.10 *** -0.01 0.01 0.01 * 0.14 *** 0.00
Foreign (11) 0.05 *** -0.01 -0.03 *** 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 * 0.15 *** 0.01 * 0.22 ***
Financing Obstacle (12) -0.01 0.06 *** 0.03 *** 0.05 *** 0.02 *** 0.05 *** 0.04 *** -0.02 ** 0.01 -0.03 *** -0.09 ***
Firm Age (13) 0.44 *** 0.06 *** 0.06 *** 0.05 *** -0.01 0.02 ** -0.05 *** 0.21 *** -0.17 *** 0.17 *** 0.03 *** -0.01
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Table 3: Macroeconomic and financial institution development indicators by country 
 
GDP is the log of real GDP in U.S. dollars. GDP per Capita is the log of real GDP per capita in U.S. dollars. GDP 
Growth is the real GDP growth rate. Inflation is the log difference of consumer price indices. Private Credit is the 
ratio of domestic banking credit to the private sector divided by GDP. EU equals one if a country belongs to the EU, 
and zero otherwise. Variable definitions and sources are described in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
 
Country 
GDP GDP per Capita GDP Growth Inflation Private Credit EU 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Albania 8,870 2,982 5.03 2.56 17.33 No 
Armenia 4,990 1,666 7.17 4.02 12.32 No 
Azerbaijan 18,100 2,052 11.96 5.35 9.41 No 
Belarus 33,200 3,456 6.13 53.64 16.72 No 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 11,100 2,890 3.89 2.81 55.86 No 
Bulgaria 29,700 3,905 2.99 5.39 29.12 Yes 
Croatia 43,900 9,973 1.65 2.98 50.61 Yes 
Czech Republic 138,000 13,305 2.56 2.55 39.97 Yes 
Estonia 13,400 9,944 4.03 4.07 64.94 Yes 
Georgia 6,880 1,559 5.65 6.43 16.40 No 
Hungary 107,000 10,620 2.00 5.84 41.85 Yes 
Kazakhstan 61,400 3,896 7.62 8.45 28.62 No 
Kosovo 4,000 2,291 5.58 2.13 23.38 No 
Kyrgyzstan 2,670 506 4.50 10.48 5.91 No 
Latvia 16,300 7,466 4.32 4.43 45.29 Yes 
Lithuania 29,300 9,358 2.64 2.70 28.13 Yes 
Macedonia 6,640 3,179 2.90 2.64 27.12 No 
Moldova 3,020 843 4.40 12.21 22.63 No 
Mongolia 2,930 1,120 7.39 9.41 24.26 No 
Montenegro 2,440 3,968 2.32 3.74 61.92 No 
Poland 329,000 8,624 3.70 3.63 29.14 Yes 
Romania 101,000 4,844 3.43 15.24 22.27 Yes 
Russia 788,000 5,482 4.98 16.84 26.02 No 
Serbia 26,100 3,547 2.89 22.40 30.61 No 
Slovakia 66,700 12,380 3.73 5.03 41.46 Yes 
Slovenia 36,400 18,031 2.25 4.21 57.85 Yes 
Tajikistan 2,520 351 7.75 12.40 13.20 No 
Turkey 494,000 7,154 3.90 22.11 23.01 No 
Ukraine 83,500 1,782 3.77 11.47 34.54 No 
Uzbekistan 16,900 617 6.83 14.66 . No 
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Table 4: Financing patterns for privatized versus ab initio private firms 
 
Panel A reports our baseline regression results, while Panel B reports results from the propensity score matching 
(PSM) analysis. In Panel A, the dependent variables are the six measures of external financing sources. Privatized is 
a dummy that equals one if a firm is a privatized former SOE, and zero if a firm is a ab initio private firm. State 
Bank, Private Bank, Equity Finance, Supplier Credit, and Informal Finance are firms’ proportion of investment 
financed by state-owned banks, private banks, equity, supplier credit, and informal sources, respectively. Bank 
Finance = State Bank + Private Bank. Firm Size is the firm’s number of permanent, full-time employees. Firm 
Growth is the firm’s growth rate of permanent, full-time employees. Exporter is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is an 
exporter, and 0 otherwise. Foreign is a dummy equal to 1 if any foreign company or individual has a financial stake 
in the ownership of the firm, 0 otherwise. The regressions are estimated using a Tobit model that includes fixed 
effects for year, country, and industry. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses. 






indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Baseline regressions 












 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Privatized 1.85** 1.30** 0.79 -0.63 0.77** -0.87* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.37) (0.20) (0.03) (0.08) 
Firm Size 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00** 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.93) (0.28) 
Firm Growth 6.84*** 0.79 6.88*** 0.33 1.34** 2.63*** 
 (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.69) (0.04) (0.01) 
Exporter 4.41*** 0.40 4.62*** -0.52 0.38* 0.12 
 (0.00) (0.21) (0.00) (0.16) (0.10) (0.81) 
Foreign -3.59*** -1.53*** -1.96** 0.50 -0.24 -0.28 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.30) (0.43) (0.63) 
       
Observations 18,059 13,085 13,085 18,059 18,059 18,059 
Year FE Yes 
Country FE Yes 
Industry FE Yes 
 
Panel B: Propensity score matching analysis 
Outcome 
Sample Treated Controls Difference T-Stat 
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(2)-(3) (5) 
Bank Finance Unmatched 18.23 15.59 2.64 4.42*** 
 
ATT 17.98 16.41 1.57 1.81** 
State Bank Unmatched 4.30 2.92 1.39 4.31*** 
 
ATT 4.20 2.63 1.57 3.31*** 
Private Bank Unmatched 14.77 12.88 1.89 3.06*** 
 
ATT 14.92 15.67 -0.75 0.81 
Equity Finance Unmatched 4.65 4.86 -0.21 0.57 
 
ATT 4.68 4.90 -0.21 0.41 
Supplier Credit  Unmatched 4.57 3.74 0.82 2.76*** 
 
ATT 4.61 3.75 0.86 1.94** 
Informal Finance Unmatched 5.75 7.33 -1.58 -3.73*** 
  ATT 5.82 6.14 -0.32 -0.58 
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Table 5: The effects of firms’ perceived financial constraints 
 
This table reports regression results after controlling for firm-level perceived financial constraints. Panel A reports 
results for the full sample after including Financing Obstacle, which embodies survey responses about firm-level 
financial constraints as specified in the survey questionnaires. We divide the full sample into two subsamples 
according to firms’ survey responses concerning their perceived financial constraints and run regressions separately 
for the subsamples. The results are reported in Panel B and Panel C. The dependent variables are the six measures of 
external financing sources. Privatized is a dummy that equals one if a firm is a privatized former SOE, and zero if a 
firm is an ab initio private firm. State Bank, Private Bank, Equity Finance, Supplier Credit, and Informal Finance 
are a firm’s proportion of investment financed by state-owned banks, private banks, equity, supplier credit, and 
informal sources, respectively. Bank Finance = State Bank + Private Bank. Firm Size is the firm’s number of 
permanent, full-time employees. Firm Growth is the firm’s growth rate in the number of permanent, full-time 
employees. Exporter is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is an exporter, and 0 otherwise. Foreign is a dummy equal to 
1 if any foreign company or individual has a financial stake in the ownership of the firm, 0 otherwise. The 
regressions are estimated using a Tobit model that includes fixed effects for year, country, and industry. Standard 
errors are clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses. Variable definitions and sources are given in 




















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
 Panel A: Control for Financing Obstacle 
Privatized 1.90** 1.16** 1.00 -0.70 0.80** -0.81 
 (0.01) 0.02) (0.25) (0.21) (0.03) (0.14) 
Financing Obstacle 1.59*** 0.22 1.17*** 0.17 0.49*** 1.07*** 
 (0.00) 0.23) (0.00) (0.23) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
Observations 16,316 12,623 12,623 16,316 16,316 16,316 
 
 Panel B: Financing Obstacle = 0 or 1 
Privatized 1.85* 0.65 1.94* -1.33*** 0.17 -1.04 
 (0.08) (0.21) (0.09) (0.00) (0.77) (0.13) 
       
Observations 8,893 6,546 65,46 8,893 8,893 8,893 
 
 Panel C: Financing Obstacle = 2 or 3 or 4 
Privatized 1.77* 1.69** -0.13 -0.04 1.50** -0.59 
 (0.09) (0.02) (0.92) (0.96) (0.03) (0.45) 
       
Observations 7,423 6,077 6,077 7,423 7,423 7,423 
       
Firm controls Yes 
Year/industry/country FE Yes 
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Table 6: The effects of firm lifecycle 
 
This table reports the regression results after controlling for firm age which can be treated as a proxy for a firm’s 
lifecycle. The dependent variables are the six measures of external financing sources, i.e. Bank Finance, State Bank, 
Private Bank, Equity Finance, Supplier Credit, and Informal Finance. Privatized is dummy that equals one if the 
firm is a privatized former SOE, and zero if a firm is a ab initio private firm. In Panel A we control for Firm Age 
whereas Panel B and C present subsample analysis if the firm age is less than 5 years and greater than 5 years 
respectively. All regressions include four firm-level control variables (Firm controls), i.e., Firm Size, Firm Growth, 
Exporter, and Foreign. The regressions are estimated using a Tobit model including fixed effects for year and 
industry. Country dummies are excluded from the regressions whenever country-level macroeconomic and 
institutional development variables are included in the analysis. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and 
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Table 7: The effects of macroeconomic and institutional development 
 
This table reports the regression results after controlling for various country-level macroeconomic and financial 
institution measures. Panel A controls for country-level macroeconomic variables, while Panels B, C, and D control 
for the credit market development and EU membership respectively. The dependent variables are the six measures 
of external financing sources, i.e. Bank Finance, State Bank, Private Bank, Equity Finance, Supplier Credit, and 
Informal Finance. Privatized is dummy that equals one if the firm is a privatized former SOE, and zero if a firm is a 
ab initio private firm. GDP is the log of real GDP in U.S. dollars. GDP per Capita is the log of real GDP per capita 
in U.S. dollars. GDP Growth is the real GDP growth rate. Inflation is the log difference of consumer price indices. 
Private Credit is the ratio of domestic banking credit to the private sector divided by GDP. EU equals one if a 
country belongs to the EU, and zero otherwise. All regressions include four firm-level control variables (Firm 
controls), i.e., Firm Size, Firm Growth, Exporter, and Foreign. The regressions are estimated using a Tobit model 
including fixed effects for year and industry. Country dummies are excluded from the regressions whenever 
country-level macroeconomic and institutional development variables are included in the analysis. Standard errors 
are clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in 






indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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 Privatized  Ab initio Private 
   N %  N % 
Albania 376  30 8  346 92 
Armenia 698  180 26  518 74 
Azerbaijan 552  94 17  458 83 
Belarus 517  63 12  454 88 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 619  113 18  506 82 
Bulgaria 609  109 18  500 82 
Croatia 510  94 18  416 82 
Czech Republic 754  78 10  676 90 
Estonia 545  63 12  482 88 
Georgia 410  99 24  311 76 
Hungary 803  123 15  680 85 
Kazakhstan 782  139 18  643 82 
Kosovo 140  13 9  127 91 
Kyrgyzstan 378  132 35  246 65 
Latvia 497  71 14  426 86 
Lithuania 581  100 17  481 83 
Macedonia 573  84 15  489 85 
Moldova 607  137 23  470 77 
Mongolia 188  15 8  173 92 
Montenegro 130  14 11  116 89 
Poland 1,427  139 10  1,288 90 
Romania 1,180  166 14  1,014 86 
Russia 2,646  431 16  2,215 84 
Serbia 740  114 15  626 85 
Slovakia 508  66 13  442 87 
Slovenia 637  136 21  501 79 
Tajikistan 412  127 31  285 69 
Turkey 445  9 2  436 98 
Ukraine 892  214 24  678 76 
Uzbekistan 365  167 46  198 54 
Total 19,521  3,320 17%  16,201 83% 
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Table A2: Variables and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Privatized 
 




Ab initio Private Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is ab initio private with zero state 
ownership, and 0 otherwise 
 
BEEPS 
Bank Finance Share (percentage) of firm’s financing over the previous year coming from private 
and state-owned banks 
 
BEEPS 




Private Bank  Share (percentage) of firm’s financing over the last year coming from private banks 
 
BEEPS 
Equity Finance Share (percentage) of firm’s financing over the last year coming from owners’ 
contribution or issue of new equity shares 
 
BEEPS 
Supplier Credit Share (percentage) of firm’s financing over the last year coming from supplier credit  
 
BEEPS 
Informal Finance Share (percentage) of firm’s financing over the last year coming from informal 
money lenders, friends, relatives, non-banking financial institutions etc. 
 
BEEPS 
Firm Size Number of permanent, full-time employees at the end of last year 
 
BEEPS 
Firm Growth The average difference of last year’s number of permanent, full-time employees and 
number of permanent, full-time employees three years prior 
 
BEEPS 
Exporter Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is an exporter, and 0 otherwise 
 
BEEPS 
Foreign Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if any foreign company or individual has a 





“How problematic is access to finance for the current operations of a business?”  No 
Obstacle = 0, Minor Obstacle = 1, Moderate Obstacle = 2, Major Obstacle = 3, and 
Very Severe Obstacle = 4 
 
BEEPS 
GDP Logarithm of GDP in constant 2005 US$, average over 1999–2013 WDI 
   
GDP per Capita Logarithm of GDP per capita in constant 2005 US$, average over 1999–2013 WDI 
   
GDP Growth Real growth rate of GDP, average over 1999–2013 WDI 
   
Inflation Log difference of consumer prices, average over 1999–2013 
 
WDI 
Private Credit Credit extended to private businesses over GDP, average over 1999–2013 
 
IFS 
EU Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country is an EU member as of 2014, 
and 0 otherwise 
 
EU 
* Sources of Data: BEEPS = Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and World Bank; WDI = World Development Indicators, World Bank; IFS = 
International Financial Statistics; EU = European Union Website.  
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